As databases grow more prevalent and comprehensive, database administrators seek to limit disclosure of con dential information while providing access to data. Practical databases accommodate users with heterogeneous needs for access. Each class of data user is accorded access to only certain views. Other views are considered con dential, and hence to be protected. Using illustrations from health care and education, this article addresses inferential disclosure of con dential views in multi-dimensional categorical databases. It demonstrates that any structural, so data-value-independent, method for detecting disclosure can fail. Consistent with previous work for two-way tables, it presents a data-value-dependent method to obtain tight l o wer and upper bounds for con dential data values. For two-dimensional projections of categorical databases, it exploits the network structure of a linear programming
Introduction
Database administrators implement policies and technologies to limit disclosure of con dential information while providing access to legitimate information (Schl orer 1975 Duncan and Lambert 1986 Adam and Wortman 1989 . A \data snooper" must not obtain, directly or through inference, knowledge of the con dential data. Direct disclosure occurs with unauthorized access, as through password breaking or communication eavesdropping. Methods such a s m ulti-level authorization control, password protection and encryption help prevent direct disclosure, and are not our concern here. Rather we seek to protect against inferential disclosure (Denning 1980) , thereby providing disclosure protection against data snoopers who have access to the database, but lack authorization to every aspect of it.
Inferential disclosure is harder to control than is direct disclosure. In inferential disclosure the data snooper uses legitimately accessible information to infer con dential information. To guard against inferential disclosure, the database administrator must assess the vulnerability of a database. Disclosure detection techniques can be applied both to a database in its original form or to a database that has been transformed to limit disclosure. Thus disclosure detection|\to distinguish safe from unsafe data" (Willenborg and de Waal 1996, p. vii) |is an essential component o f a n y strategy for database security.
For research and statistical purposes, the most common products disseminated from databases are tables. Previous works have addressed the case of disclosure detection and protection in two-dimensional tables (Cox 1980 Carvalho, Dellaert, and Osorio 1994 Muralidhar, Batra and Kirs 1995 . We focus on multi-dimensional categorical databases, which are N-dimensional tables with each dimension categorical. Cell entries may be counts or other numerical values. Motivated by U. S. Census Bureau surveys such as the Census of Wholesale Trade and the Census of Construction Industries, which release three-dimensional tables, Cox (1992) argues for the need to examine disclosure issues in higher-dimensional tables. In the commercial sector, a variety o f t o o l s p r o vide multi-dimensional views of relational data in data warehousing (Barquin and Edelstein 1997, p. 174) . With the increasing use of data warehousing, security concerns in multi-dimensional tables have become signi cant.
Our concern is disclosure detection for linked tables (i.e., tables that share a common attribute), as discussed in Willenborg and de Waal (1996, pp. 108{111, 130{134) and De Vries (1993) . We show that disclosure detection by a purely structural approach, i.e., based on database design alone, can give a false sense of security for linked tables. As proof, we give a method, based on linear programming, to infer bounds on the values of con dential views.
Inference is based solely on the actual contents of the accessible views of the database. Beyond showing the inadequacies of a structural approach, this technique provides a systematic method that the database administrator can use for disclosure detection. Linear programming methods have been used in various aspects of con dentiality research, for instance by Kelly, Golden and Assad (1990) , Sande (1984) , Cox (1987) and Zayatz (1992) .
LP methods are exible in their application to disclosure detection problems, since ad-ditional, possibly external, information can be accommodated in the form of constraints.
They do, however, have t wo general shortcomings. First, LP methods are computationally intensive. This is evidently a problem for a large database. It is also a problem for a dynamic database. With increasingly sophisticated real-time data capture methods, more and more databases are dynamic. Disclosure detection methods must depend on the actual contents of the database, and so disclosure detection must be implemented e a c h time the database changes. As a related point, Gus eld (1988) noted that in actual systems concerned with statistical security, a disclosure detection algorithm is typically part of the inner loop of a larger program that repeatedly modi es tables in attempts to eliminate disclosure. Thus any ine ciencies in the detection stage are magni ed many times. The outer loop typically works through imposition of a variety of heuristic procedures. Their e cacy is then checked through the disclosure detection inner loop. The second shortcoming of an LP algorithm is that it yields little insight i n to the causes of a potential disclosure, and hence does not suggest how to transform a database to limit disclosure.
In order to address these two shortcomings of the LP method, we d e r i v e a simple and e cient matrix method that gives identical results in an important special case. This method, which w e call matrix comparative assignment (MCA), exploits the network structure of the LP model when the accessible tables share a common attribute. MCA is fast enough to be used with large and dynamic databases (it can become the fast inner loop of a comprehensive statistical data security system), and its structure suggests e cient disclosure limitation transformations. The rapid introduction of information technology into health care management has raised sensitivities to con dentiality issues (Duncan 1997) . 
A Structural Approach for Disclosure Detection
In a structural approach a database administrator attempts to detect disclosure potential at the time of database design. Any structural method must be valid irrespective of the speci c numerical values in the database. Fellegi (1972) gave a general method for determining whether a published table (or set of tables) will admit inferential disclosure. He derived a set of equations which, if solvable, yield the value of a con dential datum in terms of the data contained in the released table(s). The following results obtain directly from Fellegi's work and the fact that the non-con dential projections give linear equations that underconstrain the cell values in the underlying 
Linear Programming Formulation
Given the contents of the accessible tables, linear programming can be used to calculate the maximum and minimum values possible for the entries in the con dential table. Mathematical optimization methods are used to assess upper and lower possible values in con dential two-way tables by C o x (1987) and Sande (1984) . The upper and lower bounds for a sensitive cell are called the ambiguity width by Robertson (1994) and feasibility interval by Willenborg and de Waal (1996, p. 101) . Some problems in three-dimensional tables are addressed by linear programming methodology in Lougee-Heimer (1989) . We extend this approach t o a n N-dimensional problem. We view each cell value in each accessible table as the right hand side of a linear programming equality constraint. As suggested by Figure 1 , each projection cell is a sum of cell values in the underlying, full-dimensional Figure 2 .
Using the LP approach w e obtain the (lower, upper)-bounds shown in Figure 3 . In the Patient-Treatment (PT) table, for four out of the nine entries a disclosure has taken place, since the minimum is greater than 0. Thus a snooper might get considerable information from these accessible tables. Note that the solutions obtained by the model are integer. This is not happenstance, as we demonstrate in Section 4.
4 Two-Dimensional Views: Networks and Matrices
In the common case where two-dimensional views of a three-dimensional table are made accessible, the linear programming formulation has a network structure that can be exploited to develop a simple and e cient procedure. Cox (1992 Cox ( , 1995 has exploited a network structure for a two-dimensional problem. Ernst (1989) demonstrated some general problems with network formulations when N 3. (See also Cox 1980 Cox 1987 Cox, Fagen, Greenberg and Hamming 1986 Gus eld 1988 Sullivan and Zayatz 1991 Rowe 1991 .) Cox (1992) identi es the case of N 3 as an important research problem. We use the health care management example introduced in Section 1 with N = 3 to illustrate the network structure of the problem where two-dimensional views are made accessible.
Network Formulation of the Health Care Example
The health care example can be recast as a collection of smaller problems, each w i t h a special network structure. Using this insight, we develop simple solution procedures that are compactly expressed as matrix operators on the two-dimensional, accessible views.
Denote the underlying 3-dimensional De nition 1 A network is densely connected (DC) i (a) it is a directed, bipartite graph (b) the source n o des are in one partition and the destination nodes are in the other (c) each source n o de is connected to every destination node and (c) the sum of the supplies in the source p artition is equal to the sum of the demands in the destination partition.
Observation 1 Suppose the constraint equations arising from the projection T +jk are m u ltiplied b y ;1. Then the constraints of our problem can be r epresented b y a c ollection of DC
DoctorTreatment Table   DoctorPatient  Table   - : subnetworks. Speci cally, (a) each constraint in the LP is a node in a subnetwork, (b) if the right-hand-side of the constraint is positive then it is a source n o de and if it is negative then it is a destination node (c) each variable is represented b y a n a r c whose source i s a c onstraint in which its coe cient in the LP matrix is +1 and whose destination is a constraint in which its coe cient is ;1. S i n c e e ach variable is present in only two constraints, each arc has a unique source and unique destination in the subnetwork.
Observation 2 The objective function of the linear programming formulation is a linear combination of as many variables as there a r e subnetworks. Further, since e ach variable in the objective function appears in only one subnetwork, the linear program can be d e composed into separate single variable optimization problems. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , where each doctor de nes an optimization problem.
Observation 3 The optimal objective function value of the linear program is the sum of the optimal values of each subnetwork.
We next present t wo procedures, VAP-1 and VAP-2 (VAP stands for value assignment procedure), that compute the maximum and minimum ows in a densely connected network then we p r o ve the optimality of these procedures. Proof: This follows directly from the decomposability of the overall network.
Similarly, w e de ne an algorithm that determines the minimum ow on an arc in a densely connected network. Referring again to Figure 4 , the minimum ow along the arc joining D 1 T 1 and D 1 P 1 can be determined by Since the supply at D 1 T 1 cannot be completely consumed by destination nodes D 1 P 2 and D 1 P 3 , the minimum ow is 8-(2+5)=1.
Proposition 3 VAP-2 computes the minimum ow on an arc in a densely connected network.
Proof: The ow g i v en by the procedure is clearly feasible, since all the remaining source nodes are free to supply the sink node of the given arc. It is also the minimum ow, since if the demands of all other nodes have been met, the remainder must be directed to the arc's sink node.
Corollary 3 Let S 1 . . . S J be t h e J densely connected networks equivalent to the constraint matrix of the linear programming formulation P. Applying VAP-2 to each of the these J instances and summing gives the minimum value of the objective function of the LP.
Proof: Again, this follows directly from the decomposibility of the network.
In this section, we h a ve shown that the linear programming formulation can be interpreted as a collection of network ow problems, each h a ving an especially simple solution. While disclosure detection via linear programming can, at least theoretically, be done in polynomial time, the new algorithms given here are attractive because they eliminate the need for translation of the detection problem to LP format, and can, as we demonstrate further below, considerably reduce the computational burden.
The Matrix Comparative Assignment Approach
The logic embedded in procedures VAP-1 and VAP-2 can be recast as simple, but original, matrix operations. Consider the basic operation used in the VAP-1 procedure. In each subnetwork the minimum of the supply value and demand value associated respectively with the source and destination of the variable being maximized is computed. The value of the objective function for the LP (by Corollary 2) that determines the maximum value of a cell in the con dential table is the sum of the values returned by VAP-1 applied to each subnetwork structure. The maximum value that a cell in the con dential table can take is the sum of the minima of \supplies" and \demands" of subnetwork structures. These supplies and demands are simply cell values of the accessible tables. This insight (and a complementary one for VAP-2) suggests two new matrix operators, Cell-Maxima and Cell-Minima .
They encode the logic embedded in VAP-1 and VAP-2. These matrix operations are not only straightforward and intuitively appealing, but they are fast to compute and yield insights to disclosure limitation through cell suppression.
De nition 2 Let A = a ij ] be a n I J matrix and B + is the maximum of zero a n d t h e a r gument.
The cell-minima operation is the logic encoded in VAP-2 to compute the surplus supply, i f any, at the source node of the variable being minimized. Since the cell-max operation is the same as VAP-1 and the cell-min operation is the same as VAP-2, they yield the same bounds as the LP approach.
Applying the two matrix operators de ned above to the medical example, we nd P T U = P D DT = 
where E is a matrix of all ones and I is the identity matrix, each of appropriate dimensionality.
Using these operators we develop the matrix comparative assignment (MCA) algorithm to nd the bounding matrices for a con dential table. This algorithm is given for twodimensional accessible tables, but may be extended to higher dimensions under certain conditions.
Algorithm MCA 1. Identify two jointly con dential attributes, say i and k (Patient and Treatment).
Identify all accessible tables which h a ve one or the other of these attributes (Patient-Doctor and Doctor-Treatment). From that set, choose a pair of tables which h a ve a non-con dential attribute in common, say R(i j) and R(j k).
2. Find x U j (i k) = R(i j) R(j k) and x L j (i j) = R(i j) R(j k). These are the upper and lower bounds for x(i k) obtained through j.
Repeat
Step 2 for each a vailable j.
4. The tightest MCA bounds for x(i k), denoted x U (i k) and x L (i k), are given by
Note that the MCA approach is not limited to inference over a single pair of tables.
It is possible to use sequences of pairs of tables to discover bounds. 
Extensions to Higher Dimensions
The MCA approach is extensible to higher dimensions under certain conditions. For example, if the two tables, Patient-Doctor-Symptom and Doctor-Symptom-Treatment, were available, then a three-dimensional analog of MCA could compute bounds on the con dential PatientTreatment table. Intuitively, the maximum number of treatments T 1 that patient P 1 could have had, for example, is the sum over all doctors and symptoms of the minimum of the number of times P 1 visited a doctor with that symptom and the number of times that doctor prescribed T 1 for that symptom. Since in this case we h a ve that the number of patients seen by doctor j with symptom k must equal the number of treatments given by doctor j for symptom k, this upper bound is feasible. Similar reasoning yields a higher-dimensional version of the lower-bounding operator.
More generally, w e can de ne the following.
De nition 4 Let A = a ijk ] be a n I J K array and B 
Likelihood of Disclosure
The Matrix Comparative Assignment (MCA) approach a l s o g i v es insight i n to how often a database T ijk ] is vulnerable to inferential disclosure from related, but accessible, tables. In principle this question is unanswerable since millions of databases exist, each with di erent c haracteristics. Access to a meaningful number of these databases is impractical, for con dentiality reasons among others. However, we can use plausible probability models for database entries T ijk and derive suggestive results. Broadly, the models we consider are sparse- The MCA approach p r o vides direct evidence of when a cell lower bound is greater than zero. From the structure of the cell-minima operator as given in De nition 3, we can deduce that a non-zero disclosure will occur for cell ik when
T rjp for any j = 1 . . . m :
For simplicity, take fT ijk g to be exchangeable, and let p be the probability t h a t X > Y .
Further assume that the T ijk are mutually independent random variables. The probability of a disclosure in the ik cell can then be shown to be q = 1 ; (1 ; p) m .
Sparse- Table Models The original database T ijk ] is sparse if many of the cell values are 0 and values greater than 1 never or very rarely occur. It might seem that with generally small entries, a disclosure because of a lower bound on a cell entry above zero would rarely occur. This intuition is wrong. To establish this we m o d e l T ijk as independent a n d i d e n tically distributed Bernoulli random variables with parameter . A cell is then 0 with probability 1 ; . F or simplicity, we t a k e I = J = m, s a y. In this case, X Bernoulli( ) a n d Y Binomial((m ; 1) Table Model disclosures in the table can be relatively high. As the size of the table m increases, the proportion of non-zero disclosures decreases, approaching a limiting value of 1=em (where e = 2 :7 1 8 . . . ) .F i g u r e5p r e s e n ts results for di erent v alues of m.
Mixture Models
For tables that are not sparse, a reasonable and common probability model for the cell entries is that of independent P oisson distributions where the mean varies from cell to cell. We take the variation in cell means to have a probability distribution F( ). A standard and useful approach i s t o t a k e F to be a gamma distribution, say with parameters and . With In this section, we s h o w that bounds on linear combinations of sensitive cells can be obtained which are tighter than those obtained using aggregations of single cell optimizations. In our previous development, determinations of upper and lower bounds were done univariately, i.e., by considering only one con dential cell at a time. In this section we extend this development to bounds on functions of more than one cell value. We show b y w ay of an example that this more e cient estimation is indeed possible. We nd bounds on linear combinations of sensitive data which a r e t i g h ter than those obtainable from a univariate analysis.
The data for this example were obtained from a Carnegie Mellon University student database. Using aggregation operations which w ould typically be considered non-revealing of sensitive data, this relatively large database was condensed to the tables presented here.
Thus it is a practical example of what a serious data snooper might be able to achieve. We calculated univariate upper and lower bounds on the grades each student could have received. From these bounds, we used a counting scheme to obtain upper and lower bounds on students' grade-point a verages (GPA). Speci cally, a student's univariate maximum GPA was calculated by assuming that she actually received the number of A+ grades equal to the univariate maximum for A+, the number of A grades equal to that maximum, and so forth until her grade total equaled her course total. The univariate minimum was computed analogously, starting instead from B.
A m ultivariate estimation of GPA w as calculated using the LP approach with all accessible cell values as constraints. An expression representing student G P A w as used as the objective function. A comparison of the bounds in Figure 8 shows that the multivariate approach can give t i g h ter bounds than the univariate approach. When disclosure detection methods ag a con dentiality risk problem, data can only be released after the application of appropriate disclosure limitation methods. For any proposed limitation method, a disclosure audit should be performed. This section shows the advantages of the LP method and the MCA method in a disclosure audit of the tables protected through disclosure limitation.
Disclosure limitation methods for tabular data include rounding, random rounding (Nargundkar and Saveland 1972), controlled rounding (Fellegi 1977, Kelly, Golden and Assad 1990) , cell suppression (Carvalho et al. 1994) , interval protection (Gopal, Goes and Gar nkel 1998) and perturbation (Duncan and Fienberg 1998) . In most of these procedures marginal totals are maintained or nearly maintained. Consider rounding to base b (every cell entry is rounded to the nearest integer multiple of b). In the LP formulation, instead of equality constraints, inequalities would be introduced. These inequalities re ect the imprecision in the snooper's knowledge of the actual values. The goal in disclosure limitation is to increase the size of the base b until all bounds on con dential cell entries are adequately wide. The LP approach permits a disclosure audit for each b a s e b.
If the projection tables have been modi ed by cell suppression, the MCA method, with its inherent computational advantages, can be used. To see this, recall that in obtaining bounds for a given cell in the con dential table, pairs of values in the accessible projections are compared by either the cell-min or cell-max operators. Suppose that one of such a pair is suppressed. Then for the upper bound, which uses the cell-min operator, simply take t h e value in the suppressed cell to be inde nitely large. The minimum of this pair is then the value of the unsuppressed cell. Clearly the upper bound may only be increased as a result.
If both cells in a min comparison are suppressed, the minimum is taken as in nite. In this case the overall upper bound will also be in nite. Similar remarks apply for the lower bound, substituting a value of zero for the suppressed cell or cells if it is in the A matrix (supply node) and in nity i f i t i s i n t h e B matrix (demand node). Note the lower bounds may only decrease when suppressions occur. These extensions are easily incorporated into the overall algorithm.
As further illustration, consider suppression to ensure a lower bound of zero for a sensitive Any one of these cell suppression patterns are candidates as cell suppressions. Any o f them would be adequate to drive the lower bound to zero for the sensitive c e l l e n try if the suppressed cell entries in the A matrix could be taken to be small enough, say zero, or the cell entries in the B matrix large enough. However, they cannot be so taken because of certain other constraints on the tables. First, even though we assume that neither the row and column marginals, nor the grand total, are explicitly released, the grand total of the cell counts is known (by simple summation) if either original released (Willenborg and de Waal 1996, p. 92) . Developing computationally e cient disclosure limitation methods in this context is a challenging problem. Some initial e orts in this direction are in 7 The Relative Merits of MCA and LP
The MCA approach has two major advantages over the LP approach. The rst advantage is computational, the second, conceptual. MCA assures optimal results with very fast computation when applied to tightly-linked projections of the original N-way table. Working through a maximum of N ;2 such procedures, the MCA algorithm converges on the tightest bounds. The MCA algorithm is a remarkably simple means for detecting disclosure potential in tables. Therefore it can be easily implemented for standard disclosure audits. As we h a ve seen in Sections 5 and 6, MCA has the conceptual advantage that it identi es precisely how cell entries in the released tables in uence the upper and lower bounds of the con dential table. This is useful in seeing how disclosures arise and in developing disclosure limitation procedures.
The LP approach w orks directly on the N-dimensional data and generates the tightest bounds in one pass, but with substantially more computation. On the other hand, the LP approach is more exible in modeling new situations. If the data snooper knows about one of the entries of the con dential table, then this knowledge can be captured in the LP approach by simply adding a new constraint to the problem. Also, as we s a w in the previous section, the LP approach readily deals with disclosure audits of tables protected through rounding methods. Further, multivariate optimization is easily implemented using the LP approach, since it requires only a simple change in the objective function.
Conclusions
It is broadly understood that there can be no quick and easy solution to con dentiality and data access problems. Although design-time disclosure limitation methods do apply to direct disclosure, we h a ve s h o wn that there is no design-time or structural approach w h i c h comprehensively addresses the problem of inferential disclosure.
We h a ve considered disclosure risk when multiple projections or views of an underlying database are published. Using linear programming to arrive at bounds on sensitive information is not new however, the LP bounding procedure has been applied only to a single table, rather than multiple views. Our results establish that an additional level of disclosure checking is warranted. An organization collecting sensitive information must not only check each individual table it publishes it must also look at the cumulative information contained in multiple published tables. This article provides an analysis of the probability of disclosure for tables.
A second contribution of this article is to the special and important case of published two-dimensional views of the higher-dimensional table. We h a ve developed a fast detection algorithm (MCA) based on new matrix operations. We h a ve also explained how this method relates to the general area of statistical database protection.
Here is a concluding paragraph that George doesn't particularly like. Should we include it, modify it, or delete it?
Future work in this area could focus on disclosure limitation for suites of published tables.
Conventional single-table measures (cell suppression, rounding, and noise masking) can be expanded to cover the entire suite. For large datasets, the computational burden may b e large heuristics of the type now used in cell suppression, for instance, might be adapted to the multiple-table case. In any e v ent, with increasing availability of data in numerous forms, defensive measures considered prudent y esterday need rethinking today t o p r o vide con dentiality tomorrow.
